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Argentina has ﬁnally restructured its foreign debt. Its credit
rating is up, and its debt is back in the index. The new bonds
are trading roughly in line with Brazil and Uruguay’s, just above
400 basis points over treasuries for instruments of comparable
duration. Argentina is raising new money from foreign investors.
Earlier in the summer of 2005, it reopened a domestic dollar
issue to accommodate excess foreign demand. Argentina and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are on again. They might
even sign a new disbursing program after the fall 2005 congressional elections. Like a bad dream, the 2001 default is fading
into the night after three years of brisk growth and impressive
ﬁscal management—even as the usual nabobs natter on about
structural reform and unhappy bondholders.
Has the biggest sovereign debt default in history passed
without answering the urgent legal and policy questions it posed,
and with barely a ripple in the global ﬁnancial markets? So far,
pretty much. Which is not to say that the episode is over or that
it has been unimportant.
Before its foreign bond exchange, Argentina owed about
$82 billion in principal and $20 billion in past due interest.
Hundreds of thousands of creditors held 150 kinds of defaulted
instruments issued in six currencies under the laws of eight jurisdictions. Creditors owed just over 76 percent of the total, or $62
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billion in principal, got $35 billion in new performing bonds.
Other performing debt at the time of the exchange included
over $40 billion in domestic and about $30 billion in multilateral obligations. Argentina left behind almost $25 billion in
defaulted principal and interest.
The scale of Argentina’s operation is a multiple of earlier
bond restructurings: Russia exchanged on the order of $30
billion, Ecuador $6 billion, Uruguay $5 billion, Ukraine $3
billion, and Pakistan under $1 billion. These and other crises
spread anxiety about the international system’s ability to manage
ﬁnancial globalization. The trauma and drama of Argentina’s
debt default in 2001 seemed to validate this anxiety. Overnight,
Argentina’s middle class plunged into poverty, and Italian retirees lost their savings. With so many lives and so much money at
stake, expectations ran high that Argentina’s restructuring would
instantly change the world of emerging-market sovereign debt.
The high stakes may help explain the unusually contentious
tone of the debt exchange. All involved felt profoundly aggrieved
even as they disagreed vigorously on whom to blame. Foreign
investors blamed a succession of Argentine governments and
the IMF; Argentine politicians blamed one another, the foreign
investors, and the IMF; the IMF blamed Argentine politicians,
the markets, and G-7 fecklessness; and the Argentine public
blamed all of the above.
Just as soon as the Argentine government announced the
results of its tender on March 18, 2005, editorial pages worldwide heralded a new era for sovereign debt, for the emerging
markets, and occasionally for international ﬁnance. Their views
on Argentina’s lessons were as disparate as they were deﬁnite.
Some said the exchange would close the markets to middleincome countries. To others, it reaﬃrmed the markets’ resilience.
Some claimed it proved the need for statutory sovereign bankruptcy. Others said it clearly discredited the idea. Most spoke
too soon.
By the time the deal settled in June 2005, it had conﬁrmed
many presumptions about emerging-market debt and shattered
none. So far, lawsuits have not yielded a penny for the creditors. They failed to stop the exchange or dent Argentina’s recovery. Bondholders failed to stick together; the markets failed to
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banish a defaulter; and the oﬃcial sector failed to change the
outcome.1 Even documentation for the new securities breaks
little new ground. Smaller restructurings that came before
might look more revolutionary for introducing the tools, such
as aggregated collective action clauses, that Argentina adapted
on such a vast scale.
The real lessons of Argentina’s restructuring so far are more
subtle and complex than the surrounding commentary. The
default and the exchange were both points in a longer ﬁnancial
restructuring process that began before the default and will go
on for years after the exchange. Argentina’s unorthodox debt
management immediately before and after the default is partly
responsible for the outcome of the exchange. With $25 billion
in defaulted debt still outstanding, Argentina’s most important innovations may well be ahead.
The default and the passage of time shifted bargaining
leverage to the debtor. Already overextended in Argentina by
the time of the default, the IMF had little ﬁnancial or political capital left for policy activism postcollapse. If anything, it
innovated by omission. But private creditors failed to ﬁll the
resulting policy gap to enhance their own position. For Argentina, restructuring external debt was bound up with allocating
losses from the ﬁnancial crisis and political realignment after
2001. Its government committed to deliver a deal on its own
terms, and it generally succeeded. Will this encourage others
to default or to pursue punitive restructurings? What recourse
is left for the creditors? And what, if anything, can the oﬃcial
sector do after Argentina to project a constructive vision of
sovereign restructurings?

P R O LO G U E : D O M E S T I C D E B T A N D
OT H E R G Y M N A S T I C S
Argentina’s latest round of troubles began after Russia
defaulted and Brazil devalued in 1998–99 (Mussa 2002). Its
“convertibility” regime—the one-to-one peg of the Argentine
peso to the US dollar—helped defeat hyperinﬂation in
the early 1990s but required sustained access to external
ﬁnancing. Argentina ran perennial budget deﬁcits. The dollar
was high, commodity prices low. As markets closed and
exports collapsed, the government turned to oﬃcial lenders,
domestic banks, and pension funds to ﬁnance its budget and
trade deﬁcits.
In 2001, three years into a recession, Argentina’s hopes

1

The oﬃcial sector comprises the IMF, World Bank, regional development
banks, G-7 and G-10 governments, and the group of bilateral creditors that
meet in the Paris Club.
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for economic growth looked increasingly fanciful absent drastic, painful policy change. That year the government launched
three operations that tried and failed to solve its debt problem
(Republic of Argentina 2005a). In February, it swapped about
$4 billion in external bonds, extending near-term maturities.
The famous mega-exchange in June pushed oﬀ maturities on
over $30 billion at the cost of increasing Argentina’s foreigncurrency, foreign-law debt stock and raising the spreads to
levels that undermined market conﬁdence.
The third exchange was more unusual. In November
2001, Argentina oﬀered to swap about $42 billion in foreign
bonds for loans governed by Argentine law and secured by
dedicated tax revenues. The exit instrument was designed to

Has the biggest sovereign debt default
in history passed without answering the
urgent legal and polic y questions it posed,
and with barely a ripple in the global
financial markets? So far, pretty much.

appeal to Argentine ﬁnancial institutions that had come to
hold about 40 percent of the government’s foreign bonds.
(Russia’s default and punitive restructuring of its treasury bills
had made foreign investors brieﬂy wary of domestic-law debt.)
The exchange dramatically reduced Argentina’s foreign-law
debt and helped partially to segregate investors with diﬀerent
preferences into diﬀerent instruments.
The swap did not prevent default on Argentina’s foreign
bonds, which came on Christmas Eve in 2001 after the IMF
refused further disbursements. Convertibility collapsed, and
the peso fell to a quarter of its precrisis value. After weeks of
riots and a succession of presidents, Argentina enacted emergency measures that led to more dramatic changes in its debt
stock. It converted into pesos all public and private domesticlaw debt, including the loans resulting from the November
exchange. These loans continued to perform throughout the
default episode, albeit in pesos and at even lower interest rates.
The government then proceeded to issue over $20 billion in
dollar- and peso-denominated domestic-law debt (primarily
the Boden bonds) to compensate domestic constituencies for
damage from the crisis. The Boden paid low interest rates, and
only a small portion of them traded. Those that traded became
a favorite among foreign investors, who calculated that the
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government would not default on the obligation that now
formed much of the capital in the Argentine banking system.
The net result was a radical transformation of Argentina’s
debt stock. Before the November 2001 exchange, December
2001 default, and February 2002 “pesiﬁcation,” almost 70
percent (nearly all the debt owed to private creditors) was in
performing foreign-currency, foreign-law bonds. A year later,
these bonds represented just over a third of the total and were
mostly in default, trading at some 20 cents on the dollar.
Performing debt comprised almost $40 billion in domesticlaw instruments and over $30 billion in debt to multilateral
institutions. Foreign bonds regained some of their share in
mid-2003, when Argentine pension funds that had rejected
pesiﬁcation of their guaranteed loans were forced to revert to
their defaulted global bonds.
The identity of Argentina’s creditors also changed over
time, most dramatically in the past three years. In the mid1990s, Argentina borrowed chieﬂy from foreign institutional
investors. As the recession wore on and institutional interest
wore thin, Argentina tapped unprecedented numbers of European, and to a lesser extent Asian, retail investors. In the runup to the crisis, it turned to multilateral and captive domestic
institutions. After the default, compensation bonds expanded
the holdings of domestic creditors. Meanwhile, speculative investors—mostly foreign institutions—began to buy
performing domestic debt and soon defaulted foreign bonds.
These changes, some driven by the markets and others by
Argentine policies, helped shape the debt exchange in 2005.

THE OFFER: DUBAI TERMS FOR ALL
Argentina ﬁrst broached the restructuring terms with its
creditors at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in Dubai
in September 2003, almost two years after the default. The
“Dubai Terms” set a political benchmark for the government—
75 percent debt reduction and no recognition of past due
interest (potentially 90 percent in present value terms at
market discount rates).
The creditors were outraged. Three months after Dubai,
disparate investor groups united under the umbrella of the
Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (GCAB) to pool
negotiating leverage and demand a better deal. The committee claimed to represent about $40 billion in US, European,
and Japanese creditors. It joined forces with another group
representing Argentine nationals.
Several GCAB members sought to represent retail investors in Europe and Asia. These investors generally were not
repeat players and knew little about emerging-market debt.
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Many individuals bought Argentine bonds for their retirement accounts from European and Japanese banks. After the
default, Argentina and its institutional creditors found it hard
to predict retail behavior.
GCAB unveiled its own “Dubai Terms” in response to
a slightly improved proposal from Argentina in June 2004,
valued at about 20 cents on the dollar (GCAB 2004). Creditor
demands included full recognition of past due interest and
recovery values over 60 cents on the dollar. One Wall Street
analyst wrote that the group was “repeating the government’s
strategy in Dubai: to present something that will hardly help
in the very same negotiation process” (Deutsche Bank, July
13, 2004). These polar opposite positions set the tone for
the remainder of Argentina’s restructuring, as competing road
shows grew increasingly strident.
In the end, GCAB did not move, and Argentina moved
some. In January 2005, the government oﬀered a ﬁnal menu
of par, discount, and quasi-par bonds that the markets valued
slightly above 30 cents on the dollar. It included instruments
linked to Argentina’s future economic growth and added a
small amount of cash by backdating the exchange to December 2003. During this period, the authorities sustained budget
surpluses unprecedented by Argentine standards, as the
economy grew by over 8 percent. This economic performance
both made Argentina a more attractive credit and seemed to
validate creditor contentions that it could pay more.
But the biggest change took place in the markets. In the
15 months since the Dubai meetings, spreads on emergingmarket debt fell dramatically as global investment capital
searched for yields. Interest rates in the United States, Europe,
and Japan were at historic lows. What might have looked like
an outrageous oﬀer in 2003 looked more attractive using 2005
discount rates. GCAB’s institutional constituents were quietly
peeling oﬀ; some began buying up defaulted debt from retail
investors who had lost patience. In the end, most institutions
appear to have tendered in the exchange. Even as Italian retail
leaders publicly denounced what they called Argentina’s cramdown, billions of dollars in Italian retail holdings were tendering or selling to participating funds. The largest single pool
of retail claims, representing over $1 billion in German and
Austrian investments, accepted Argentina’s oﬀer two hours
before the deadline.
What had looked like the new dawn of creditor organization
seemed to ﬁzzle overnight. GCAB’s website fell silent—it posted
no reaction to the exchange. True to the atomistic stereotype,
sovereign bondholders could not hold a coalition. Each acted in its
own self-interest; most came to see Argentina’s oﬀer as an opportunity for short-term gain or at least a chance to cut their losses. For
now, the sovereign debtor seemed to hold all the cards.

3

NUMBER PB05-2

L I T I G AT I O N : B O N D S I N L I M B O
In one sense, any transaction of over $80 billion that demands
unprecedented debt relief and attracts over three-quarters of the
creditors is a triumph. Argentina’s was all the more impressive
because it proceeded against the background of thousands of
creditor lawsuits, most in Argentina but also dozens in New
York and over 100 in Europe.
The conventional wisdom before Argentina’s default was
that getting a judgment against a government was much easier
than collecting on it. Since the Brady exchanges of the 1990s,
a steady undercurrent to this wisdom had emerged arguing
that litigation might yet become a potent creditor weapon.
This reasoning held that once sovereign debt took the form
of tradable bonds rather than relationship-driven bank loans,
a default would send thousands of bondholders storming the
courts to demand 100 cents on the dollar. A rush to the courthouse would jam up negotiations, delay the country’s recovery,
and inﬂict greater losses on the creditor collective.
Until Argentina, the most prominent and successful holdouts2 sued on loans, not bonds (as in Elliott Associates v. Peru).
Rather than block restructuring, they sought to proﬁt from
its success. A country that has restored its payment capacity
could better aﬀord to pay ransom; moreover, its return to the
global markets created oﬀshore payment streams that litigants
could target. Most puzzling perhaps was the fact that cooperating creditors seemed unfazed by the holdouts. They saw
payments to the holdouts as a modest tax on the restructuring
that kept the threat of enforcement real, perhaps deterring the
debtor from defaulting on the margins. At the same time, the
still-considerable risk, hassle, and expense of sovereign debt
litigation deterred emulators.
Several times Argentina looked like it might challenge
conventional wisdom, as many of its bondholders did go to
court in large numbers (Republic of Argentina 2005a). Several
bondholders secured judgments and at various stages tried to
stop the exchange oﬀer. A fund owned by the Dart family,
well-known for its holdout litigation prowess, got a judgment for $725 million. The remaining individual judgments
represented a tiny fraction of the debt—about $15 million
all told. Then the New York District Court certiﬁed a class
action against Argentina, which could have reached $4 billion
in claims. But none of this seemed to matter as Argentina
marched on with its $62 billion exchange. Lawsuits seemed

2

Holdouts are creditors who refuse to participate in a debt restructuring.
Some hold out for better restructuring terms; others refuse to participate in
any collective restructuring and sue for full payment.
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powerless to stop it, and in the words of the presiding judge in
New York, “not only have they not yielded a hundred cents on
the dollar, they have not yielded one cent on the dollar.”
The march suddenly stalled on March 21, 2005, when
NML Capital Ltd., an oﬀshore fund with connections to
Elliott Associates, moved to seize the defaulted bonds that
Argentina had accepted for the exchange.3 NML argued
that the bonds, which were ostensibly locked up in custodial
accounts in New York4 for Argentina’s beneﬁt, were assets of
the debtor that had market value and could be sold to satisfy a
future judgment. Because the bonds’ market value was a fraction of their face value, NML initially succeeded in freezing
$7 billion in bonds tendered by participating creditors to pay
its own $360 million claim. Other holdouts, including the
Darts, shortly joined NML.
Argentina’s lawyers argued among other things that
the bonds did not belong to Argentina but to the tendering
holders, that the bonds could not be Argentina’s assets and
liabilities at the same time, that if Argentina ever came to hold
the bonds they would have no value because it would cancel
them immediately, and that the government would sooner
scrap the entire $62 billion deal than go forward without
the frozen bonds. The creditors pointed out that nothing in

Argentina’s crisis seems to suggest that
default shifts the balance of power in favor
of the debtor absent official intervention.
Argentina’s contracts required it to cancel the bonds or to stop
the exchange. Since Argentina would come to hold the bonds
sooner or later, the court should prevent the government from
destroying them and instead make it turn the bonds over to
the creditors.
The trial court eventually ruled in Argentina’s favor but
kept the bonds frozen for two months while the creditors
appealed. The federal appeals court in New York upheld the
decision in a terse summary order that stressed the trial judge’s
discretion to deny remedies that might pose a risk to the overall
debt exchange, which, in turn, was important to Argentina.5

3

See NML Capital, Ltd., et al. v. Republic of Argentina, hearing transcript,
March 29, 2005, United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
4
5

Argentina contested the bonds’ precise location.

See EM Ltd. et al. v. The Republic of Argentina, summary order, May 23,
2005, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New York.
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The order may not be cited as precedent, but it reveals something about judicial thinking. Surely most large-scale sovereign
debt restructurings are important for the debtor country. And
in this case, “risk to the exchange” was at least to some extent
a function of Argentina’s refusal to proceed while some bonds
were frozen. If future judges use similar reasoning, preclosing
challenges look increasingly remote.
Some observers expressed dismay at the appellate court’s
decision to let the exchange go forward on procedural grounds
(the scope of the trial court’s discretion). The ruling is frustrating for its failure to resolve the substantive legal issues
whose seriousness the judges acknowledged. Nevertheless, the
court’s critics are unduly harsh. Every policy entity involved in
Argentina’s debt default was trying to have its cake and eat it
too. For example, the IMF seemed to call both for polite negotiations and for a sustainable debt proﬁle, yet it refused to pass
judgment on Argentina’s payment capacity. The US executive
branch continued to aﬃrm the sanctity of contracts while
pursuing their renegotiation and to insist on a solution that
was free-market yet also polite and sustainable—all the while
trying to keep up good relations with Argentina. Why should
the court, which had clear procedural grounds for punting,
make new law and volunteer to take the blame for a failed
exchange, when all other responsible institutions seemed to
wash their hands of Argentina? Given the opening, the judges
handed the hot potato right back to the IMF and the G-7.
Of course the real aim of the NML maneuver was not so
much to hoard defaulted paper but to pressure Argentina to
settle at the risk of jeopardizing the restructuring. The problem for the illiquid debtor—which Argentina turned into a
legal argument of sorts—is that paying oﬀ one creditor in
full before the closing encourages (nay, entitles) every other
creditor to demand the same and turns the restructuring into
a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served asset grab. Waiting until after the closing may encourage more holdouts the next time (few governments expect a next time on their watch) but at least would
reduce current claimants to a more manageable pool. Even in
GCAB’s assessment of Argentina’s ﬁnances, the government
could not pay all its creditors in full upfront.
Domestic bankruptcy laws are designed to preempt a
disorderly grab race for the debtor’s limited assets. These laws
do not apply to sovereign governments. Argentina’s bond
exchange seems to reaﬃrm the view that each sovereign debtor
fashions its own regime for allocating assets among its creditors.
After letting the restructuring go forward, the trial judge
certiﬁed a new batch of class actions—all but certain to yield
more judgments but no money for the creditors. They might
not appreciate the irony.
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D O C U M E N TAT I O N : A S H I F T I N TO N E
Some bondholders had sued to stop Argentina’s oﬀer on the
grounds that it would use “exit consents”—ask tendering
creditors to amend the old instruments to make them illiquid
and even harder to enforce. Ecuador was the ﬁrst to import
the technique from corporate restructurings as part of its 1999
Brady bond exchange. Since then, creditors have fought exit
consents as unfairly coercive and have succeeded in raising the
voting threshold for exit consents in many issues.
The litigants turned out to be wrong. Argentina did not
use exit consents, nor did it specify a minimum participation
threshold to make its exchange eﬀective. This approach was
not an olive branch to its creditors. It might have reﬂected
partly the reality of a mammoth exchange with so many diverse
creditor constituencies, including unpredictable retail. It also
reﬂected the government’s message since Dubai: Once it had
decided how much it could aﬀord to pay, its ultimate threat
to nonparticipating creditors was refusal to pay or to improve
the terms. An exchange that relies on exit consents, which
require threshold participation, by deﬁnition has an element
of consent. An exchange driven by the debtor’s promise to stiﬀ
nonparticipants prioritizes debt relief over near-term market
access.
In earlier exchanges, including Uruguay and the Argentine
province of Mendoza, participating creditors amended the old
bonds to withdraw the issuer’s sovereign immunity waiver with
respect to the new bonds to protect new payments. Because
Argentina chose to forego exit consents, it could not shield the
new bonds in this way from lawsuits on the old.6
Argentina took a diﬀerent approach to intercreditor equity. The “most favored creditor” (MFC) clause, which sought
to assure participating creditors that holdouts would not get
a better deal, was probably the most important and most
controversial innovation in Argentina’s new bond contracts
(box 1).
Similar language has appeared in corporate workouts and
in sovereign workouts involving commercial banks (Buchheit
2002). Argentina also used a similar device in the domestic
swap shortly before the default. The structure of the MFC
clause recalls other devices designed to level the playing ﬁeld
among creditors, such as the negative pledge clause or the
sharing clause in syndicated loans. The borrower promises
not to favor some creditors over others of equal rank and to
distribute any new value proportionately among similarly
situated creditors. Argentina’s initial version of the clause had
6

Like Uruguay before it, Argentina got incremental protection by using a trust
instead of a ﬁscal agency structure.
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Box 1 Most Favored Creditor Clause
“[I]f at any time on or prior to December 31, 2014,
the Republic voluntarily makes an offer to purchase or
exchange (a “Future Exchange Offer”) or solicits consents
to amend (a “Future Amendment Process”) any outstanding Non-Performing Securities, each Holder of Securities
shall have the right, for a period of 30 calendar days following the announcement of any such Future Exchange
Offer or Future Amendment Process, to exchange any
of such Holder’s Securities for (as applicable): (i) the
consideration in cash or in kind received by holders of
Non-Performing Securities in connection with any such
Future Exchange Offer, or (ii) debt obligations having
terms substantially the same as those resulting from any
such Future Amendment Process. . . .”
Source: Republic of Argentina (2005b).

covered private settlement as well as new oﬀers, and it might
have barred disproportionate recovery for litigants. The ﬁnal
version of the clause omitted the word “settlement,” potentially
opening the door to holdout payments and issuer buybacks.
Public statements by some investors suggest that the MFC
clause might have done more to alarm than to reassure them.
Its perceived loopholes no doubt motivated the government
in early February to pass a domestic law that raised the bar for
reopening the exchange or settling with nonparticipating creditors on the side. This inﬂation of commitment devices—the
government tying its own hands to show the markets it means
what it says—is oddly evocative of the defunct convertibility
regime. For now, it is clear that the government is determined
not to pay the holdouts. It is anyone’s guess whether and when
this latest law might go the way of convertibility.
If the law stands, it might increase on the margins the
government’s vulnerability to legal challenge. First, holdouts
will surely argue that the law amounts to a legal act formally
subordinating the old debt to the new in violation of the pari
passu (equal ranking) covenant in the old bonds. The question of whether creditors could use the pari passu clause to
attack Argentina’s new payments was raised and deferred in
the Southern District of New York in 2004. Without the law,
Argentina might have argued that the new bonds did not eﬀect
legal subordination—merely disproportionate payment.
Some have also argued that the law amounts to expropriation within the meaning of Argentina’s bilateral investment
treaties and is subject to challenge before the World Bank’s
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

6
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(ICSID). If the claimants succeed in proving expropriation
(none have on similar claims), it is far from clear that enforcing an ICSID award would be any easier than collecting on a
New York judgment. The government’s recent promise to ﬂout
other ICSID rulings is not encouraging.
In sum, the results of Argentina’s eﬀorts at intercreditor
equity remain uncertain. For now, bond documentation is a
secondary constraint to domestic politics and domestic legislation. It will come into play if and when Argentina brings
itself to overcome these domestic factors and reach out to the
holdouts.
In other respects, Argentina’s documentation is progressive
but not revolutionary (Republic of Argentina 2005a). Its new
bonds include collective action clauses pioneered by Mexico in
2003, which have since become standard in emerging-market
sovereign bonds. Most importantly, Argentina became the
ﬁrst government since Uruguay to include aggregated voting
provisions in its shelf registration statement. Should Argentina
choose to amend its debt documentation, it may proceed issue
by issue, with 75 percent of the aggregate principal amount
outstanding required to amend key terms. Alternatively, it
could amend key terms in multiple issues with the approval of
85 percent of the aggregate principal amount outstanding and
two-thirds of the principal outstanding under every aﬀected
issue. If it fails to secure the approval of any single issue, the
amendment does not take eﬀect with respect to that issue,
although the aﬃrmative votes count toward the 85 percent
threshold.7 Bonds held by entities directly or indirectly owned
or controlled by Argentina, including state-owned banks and
pension funds, are ineligible to vote.
Aggregated voting makes sense when it can be conducted
across a signiﬁcant portion of a country’s debt stock. Because
Argentina’s was the ﬁrst comprehensive debt exchange since
Uruguay’s, it was the ﬁrst opportunity for a sovereign issuer
since then to bring its debt stock within the aggregation framework. Adapting recent contractual reforms across $35 billion
in bonds with nary a protest from the markets is an impressive
achievement and a milestone for the asset class (box 2).
WHAT IS NEXT FOR ARGENTINA AND THE WORLD
Immediately after the oﬀer expired, Argentina’s government
pronounced the default episode over: Argentina had emerged
victorious from the ashes of crisis. Some market participants
and editorial observers took a more sour view, though they
7

For example, had Argentina’s defaulted bonds contained similar aggregated
collective action clauses, issues in which NML and the Darts had bought
controlling positions would have dropped out of the restructuring.
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Box 2 Bottom Fishers Save the Day
By the mid-1990s, it had become fashionable to criticize a certain kind of emerging-market investor—one that buys distressed
debt at pennies on the dollar in the hope of collecting a fabulous return. The bottom fisher and the maverick litigant were all
the same in this view and equally threatening to the system since both would disrupt orderly workouts.
In fact, the litigant has turned out to be a small and distinct subspecies of the bottom fisher. He does buy low—so low
that he can afford to invest in pressing a claim and chasing phantom sovereign assets around the world for years. With the
stark exception of the NML incident, which may or may not be repeated in light of the appellate court ruling, the litigant typically lies low until the restructuring is complete. He wants every other creditor to accept deep debt reduction, maximizing the
country’s residual payment capacity and clearing the field of competition. Beyond being a high-skill specialty sport, maverick
litigation is self-limiting. While it is plausible for a country to pay $100 million or maybe even $1 billion quietly to get rid of
the stalking nuisance, payment on the order of $25 billion seems improbable.
In contrast, the average bottom fisher wants to get the maximum recovery for minimum effort, preferably over a short
period. He may be an exemplary collective actor—content to join in the chorus pressing the debtor for a better deal and
glad to share the proceeds with others who help secure that deal. The last thing he wants is a protracted stalemate. The twomonth settlement delay following NML’s March 2005 intervention in Argentina is precisely the sort of thing that upsets the
bottom fisher’s calculus and adds to his costs.
To the extent Argentina’s offering was a success, bottom fishers deserve part of the credit. Some bought Argentine
bonds at 17 cents in 2002 and happily tendered in an exchange worth nearly double in 2005. Most probably bought in the
closing weeks. They created a market where European retail investors could sell billions of dollars in defaulted bonds. Individuals traumatized by their foray into high-risk investing sold at a discount from exchange values. They might have saved
money and tendered a week later—if they had the stomach to ride out the NML incident. They might have stayed out. In the
end, the bottom fishers pocketed the difference and assured the high level of participation in Argentina’s exchange.

too saw the exchange as an endpoint—proving that sovereign
debtors could trample creditor rights with impunity and
exuberance. Both conclusions seem premature.
No other sovereign restructuring has left behind anything
close to $25 billion in holdouts. Argentina cannot and will not
pay them all in full. What these creditors can do to Argentina
and what Argentina can do about them is far from clear.
More litigation could bring doctrinal and policy shifts.
Because Argentina privatized most of its economy in the
1990s, the government has few commercial assets available
to satisfy its creditors. As before, creditors will likely target
oﬀshore payments to or from Argentina when it issues new
bonds. For example, a US court could ﬁnd that the exchange
or, more likely, Argentina’s domestic law violated the pari passu
clause in the defaulted bonds. The remedy might include an
injunction against payments on the new bonds or some form
of pro rata distribution.
Even if legally sound, such a ruling would raise critical
policy concerns—it could turn the world’s largest payments
systems into collection agencies. Recent Belgian court decisions that had the same eﬀect prompted a law to shield Euroclear from injunctions. Early in the latest round of lawsuits
against Argentina, the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank

of New York, and the New York Clearing House all intervened
on Argentina’s side on the pari passu issue, suggesting they
will not let it be resolved in a policy vacuum. But inasmuch
as Argentina’s domestic law hurts its case against pari passu
enforcement, it also takes away a key legal argument for the
supporting agencies. The fact that few if any other countries
have enacted such laws also diminishes the systemic importance of Argentina’s case and the policy impetus for intervention.
If creditors succeed with ICSID arbitration, governments
might start pressing for new provisions in bilateral investment
treaties to address sovereign debt default and restructuring. For
example, Uruguay’s treaty with the United States speciﬁcally
shields it from expropriation claims by holdout creditors who
had been outvoted using collective action clauses in Uruguay’s
bonds. It is the only example of this approach to date.
Recent calls for new limits on foreign sovereign immunity might gain momentum if Argentina ﬂouts both court
and ICSID rulings, and especially if other countries follow
its example.
Among the more subtle eﬀects, settlement delay from the
NML lawsuit may discourage certain investors—those who
trade actively—from participating in defaulted debt exchanges
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and possibly in other transactions that might be targeted by
holdout litigants. These investors may stay out altogether or,
more likely, may demand a higher return in exchange for the
perceived rise in settlement risk. A change in the behavior of a
pivotal investor group could aﬀect the terms and outcome of
a future exchange. On the other hand, broader market conditions, such as the abundance of capital searching for yield,
might well drown out any eﬀects of this altered risk perception.
But the next act in Argentina’s restructuring drama probably will not be in court. It will unfold in the coming months
as Argentina tries to negotiate its reﬁnancing agreement with
the IMF. Less than a year after it had walked away from its last
IMF program, the government signaled a desire to reengage.
Argentina sent representatives to Washington even before
closing the debt exchange. Negotiations have been contentious. Argentina and the IMF have argued over structural
conditionality (taxes, banks, and utilities) and more recently
over monetary policy, but the fate of the holdout creditors has
weighed on the talks from the start.
In this respect, the encounter is tricky for the Fund and
its shareholders. The oﬃcial sector has tried hard to keep its
distance from Argentina’s bond restructuring operation but

With $25 billion in defaulted debt still
outstanding, Argentina’s most important
innovations may well be ahead.
has found it equally hard to avoid the appearance of complicity in the outcome. Now Argentina has decreed the restructuring done. If the IMF does not accept Argentina’s contention
that $25 billion in holdout claims are wholly uncollectable, it
might see them as a threat to policy performance, as well as
to program ﬁnancing. If the IMF renews its program without
addressing the holdout issue, it will have publicly ratiﬁed the
exchange result and, by implication, the process Argentina
used to obtain it. Yet the IMF’s recent history with Argentina
limits the alternatives.
The oﬃcial sector uses three main tools to inﬂuence the
restructuring of sovereign debt held by private creditors. First,
governments that agree to relieve a country’s debt in the Paris
Club can press the debtor to seek comparable concessions
from other creditors. Since Argentina’s Paris Club debt is tiny
(under $2 billion) and yet to be restructured, this intervention
avenue is not promising. Second, when a country secures a
disbursing program from the IMF, it usually agrees to budget
targets that frame its debt payment capacity over the life of

8

SEPTEMBER 2005

the program. In this respect, Argentina’s September 2003 IMF
program broke with precedent (IMF 2003a). In place of the
customary primary budget surplus target, the IMF implied
that Argentina must overperform a ﬂoor target by the amount
it would agree to pay its creditors. The oﬃcial sector gave up
its say over the debtor’s payment capacity.
Instead, oﬃcials used the third tool—the IMF’s policy
on lending into arrears, which allowed it to ﬁnance a country
that was making a good faith eﬀort to reach a collaborative
agreement with its creditors (IMF 2002). Argentina’s contentious relations with its creditors oﬀered the most serious
test of the policy to date. Many argue that the IMF Board
made a mockery of the policy by approving disbursements to
Argentina despite its refusal to negotiate deal terms with its
bondholders. The Argentine authorities point to their meetings with creditors as evidence of good faith. Others question
the relevance of a policy on lending into arrears to the case
of Argentina, which has seen no net new multilateral lending since the default—program disbursements only partially
covered Argentina’s repayments to the IMF.
As Argentina’s exchange drew near, the IMF Board interpreted its policy to require a comprehensive restructuring
that restores debt sustainability. The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis has not been published, though the oﬀer terms
are reportedly consistent with it. The IMF did not deﬁne
“comprehensive” (though some Board members volunteered
personal views on required participation). It is diﬃcult to
accuse Argentina of making an unreasonable oﬀer if the
terms were indeed in line with the IMF’s own analysis and
where over three-quarters of its creditors signed up. But the
Fund may argue that 76 percent falls short of comprehensive,
since Argentina can neither pay nor wish away $25 billion in
presumptively conscientious objectors. Lending at this level of
holdouts, including many retirees, would cause a political, if
not a policy, problem. And so, since the exchange has closed
and program talks have begun, the Fund and its shareholders
have been exhorting the government in general terms to deal
with the holdouts.
The Argentine government may yet save the Fund the
embarrassment if it allows inﬂation to get out of hand or
fails to meet structural conditionality in its program, such
as reforming its tax system, ﬁxing its banks, or settling its
diﬀerences with domestic utilities. Argentina might even
decide to walk away again, since it has a relatively manageable debt service schedule for the next few years against the
background of rapidly growing foreign reserves. On the other
hand, judging by the fact that the defaulted debt trades at only
a slight discount to the new performing bonds, the market
expects Argentina to reopen its oﬀer, securing or circumvent-
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Box 3 Lending into Arrears
Through most of the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, IMF rules had barred it from lending to countries in payment default
to their private creditors. As the commercial bank restructurings wore on, IMF policy had the effect of pressuring sovereign
debtors to settle with private creditors to gain access to IMF funds. The IMF economic program at times was held hostage to
private negotiations.
In 1989, the IMF Board adopted a new policy that allowed the Fund to lend notwithstanding member arrears to commercial banks. In 1998, after most emerging-market debt had shifted into tradable bonds, and after several countries had trouble
servicing those bonds, the IMF extended its policy to permit lending into arrears on bonded debt provided, among other
things, that the country was negotiating in good faith with its creditors (IMF 2002).
The following year, the Fund modified the good faith negotiation requirement in response to fears of holdout disruptions. The new policy allowed lending where “(i) prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the member’s adjustment program; and (ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith
effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.”
The good faith requirement was refined again slightly in 2002 to reflect additional, mostly procedural, principles for
engaging with creditors. Even with this improvement, few would hazard the meaning of “good faith” and “collaborative.”
Beyond its ambiguity, the good faith requirement ignores the IMF’s institutional bias in favor of lending to a country in crisis
(Tarullo 2005). This bias is especially strong and justified where a country has met all macroeconomic and structural conditions at the
core of its IMF program. Withholding funds based on procedural failings in talks with private creditors would strain IMF credibility.

ing domestic legislative approval sometime after the fall 2005
elections. Mopping up as many holdouts as possible on equal
or harsher terms is certainly in Argentina’s interest. On the
other hand, the domestic political barrier to any new concessions is extremely high. Moreover, reopening the old oﬀer will
do nothing to address the most serious litigation threat, which
comes from professional holdouts such as NML and the Darts,
aiming to recover close to 100 cents on the dollar.
The Argentine experience so far suggests that the good
faith iteration of the lending into arrears policy remains
ﬂawed. To an outside observer, recent statements indicate a
lending standard in disarray. IMF staﬀ are expert at designing
macroeconomic and structural reform programs. They have
no special expertise in evaluating the quality of a country’s
dialogue with its creditors. Proxies for good faith and collaboration, such as the level of creditor participation in a debt
exchange, are ultimately circular—they simply outsource the
good faith determination back to the creditors and ignore any
coercion factor that might have aﬀected participation.
In Argentina’s case, the Fund appears both compelled and
ultimately unable to judge fairness. In the words of IMF staﬀ,
“[T]he credibility of the Fund’s policy will depend, in part,
on a perception that the Fund actively promotes collaborative resolution to debt diﬃculties that are [sic] seen as being
generally fair to all parties” (IMF 2002). When the dust
settles years from now, it may well turn out that the outcome
of Argentina’s exchange was inevitable. For now, few if any
participants would call it either collaborative or fair. To avoid
losing more institutional credibility, the Fund may be wise to

shelve further public reﬁnement of the policy until after the
Argentina episode has played out (box 3).
The last set of unanswered questions in the wake of the
exchange concern Argentina’s impact on the international
ﬁnancial system. Already some Philippine and Nigerian legislators announced that they would follow Argentina’s example
and seek an aggressive restructuring of private debt. This
could all be grandstanding, a common legislative pastime, or
a signal of future defaults. But so far, there have been no painless sovereign defaults—Argentina’s was far from it—and so
it is probably too early to eulogize the asset class or market
discipline in general.
If anything, Argentina’s default and restructuring has
shown the terrible eﬀects of sovereign default on its people
and institutions. The economy collapsed, along with the
currency and the banking system; millions of people became
desperately poor, as presidents and ministers lost their jobs in
rapid succession. This domestic impact, more than the hope
of market access or the threat of bondholder litigation, may be
the biggest argument against default in the minds of emerging-market politicians. Argentina’s experience only reinforces
it. It remains to be seen to what extent both debtor and creditor losses from Argentina’s default will strengthen the case for
preemptive exchanges on the Uruguay model.
On the other hand, Argentina’s crisis seems to suggest
that default shifts the balance of power in favor of the debtor
absent oﬃcial intervention. Once a government defaults, it
must justify resuming payments. For as long as the economy
can grow briskly without addressing defaulted government
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debt, it is diﬃcult to see why a government would want to
engage its creditors. Argentina’s postexchange issues have all
been governed by Argentine law and used Argentine payment
channels; however, considering the limited impact of lawsuits
to date, it would be a stretch to attribute this funding strategy to litigation risk. Instead, brisk demand for Russian and
Argentine debt casts doubt on the theory that markets punish
defaulters. Two years after Uruguay’s generous, polite, and
preemptive restructuring, the spreads on its debt are embarrassingly close to Argentina’s. Good feelings from the markets
may not be bankable after all.
Argentina’s crisis also has done little so far to validate
or discredit the idea of statutory sovereign bankruptcy. The
government achieved impressive debt relief without either
collective action clauses or bankruptcy. A three-month workout would have been preferable to a three-year one, but it is
doubtful that any regime could have compressed the process
to three months in a case of this scale and complexity. To
the extent creditors had trouble coordinating, Argentina was
able to exploit their diﬀerences to get more relief and higher
participation. The last-minute attack by NML delayed the
closing but did not derail the exchange. The disruption seems
hardly worth the institutional and political eﬀort it would take
to revive the IMF’s proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM). On the other hand, $25 billion in holdouts still pose a risk to the outcome.
In the end, it is still too early to tell how Argentina might
have changed the world. We may not know for years. For now,
the revolution must wait.
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